Difference between revisions of "Speculative Execution Vulnerabilities of 2018"
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At this time we know that [[POWER9|POWER9]], [[POWER8|POWER8]], [[POWER8E|POWER8E]], POWER7+, POWER6, and certain PowerPC architectures are affected by at least some of these vulnerabilities. <ref>IBM PSIRT Blog post, [https://www.ibm.com/blogs/psirt/potential-impact-processors-power-family/ Potential Impact on Processors in the POWER family]</ref><ref>TenFourFox Development blog post, [https://tenfourfox.blogspot.co.at/2018/01/actual-field-testing-of-spectre-on.html Actual field testing of Spectre on various Power Macs]</ref><ref>Raptor Engineering GNU Social [https://social.raptorengineering.io/conversation/731 notices about POWER8 and POWER9 vulnerability]</ref><ref>Red Hat security page for [https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/speculativeexecution Kernel Side-Channel Attacks]</ref> | At this time we know that [[POWER9|POWER9]], [[POWER8|POWER8]], [[POWER8E|POWER8E]], POWER7+, POWER6, and certain PowerPC architectures are affected by at least some of these vulnerabilities. <ref>IBM PSIRT Blog post, [https://www.ibm.com/blogs/psirt/potential-impact-processors-power-family/ Potential Impact on Processors in the POWER family]</ref><ref>TenFourFox Development blog post, [https://tenfourfox.blogspot.co.at/2018/01/actual-field-testing-of-spectre-on.html Actual field testing of Spectre on various Power Macs]</ref><ref>Raptor Engineering GNU Social [https://social.raptorengineering.io/conversation/731 notices about POWER8 and POWER9 vulnerability]</ref><ref>Red Hat security page for [https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/speculativeexecution Kernel Side-Channel Attacks]</ref> | ||
| − | == CVE-2017- | + | == CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre variant 2) == |
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=== POWER9 === | === POWER9 === | ||
| − | Hardware fixes are | + | Hardware fixes are in place for [[POWER9]] Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above <ref name="hostboot-commit-fcf7d0e3" />. With these hardware changes, Spectre variant 2 is believed to be mitigated on the production POWER9 devices. |
== CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre variant 1) == | == CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre variant 1) == | ||
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Hardware fixes are in place for [[POWER9]] Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above <ref name="hostboot-commit-fcf7d0e3" />. With these hardware changes, cross-process attacks via Spectre variant 1 are believed to be fully mitigated on the production POWER9 devices. | Hardware fixes are in place for [[POWER9]] Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above <ref name="hostboot-commit-fcf7d0e3" />. With these hardware changes, cross-process attacks via Spectre variant 1 are believed to be fully mitigated on the production POWER9 devices. | ||
| − | == CVE-2017- | + | == CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown) == |
| + | |||
| + | === Common Mitigations === | ||
| + | |||
| + | POWER7, POWER8, and POWER9 are patched from CVE-2017-5754 by purging the L1 cache when context switching to a less privileged process, as the vulnerability on these architectures affects L1 but not L2 cache.<ref>Larabel, Michael. [https://www.phoronix.com/scan.php?page=news_item&px=PowerPC-Mem-Protection-Keys PowerPC Memory Protection Keys In For Linux 4.16, Power Has Meltdown Mitigation In 4.15]. 2018-01-22</ref> Firmware updates are also required to enable workarounds at the hardware level.<ref>[https://delivery04.dhe.ibm.com/sar/CMA/SFA/07dcs/1/8001-12C-22C--8005-12N-22N-OpenPowerReadme.v4.0.xhtml IBM Power8 Systems Server Firmware]</ref> <ref>[http://delivery04.dhe.ibm.com/sar/CMA/SFA/07dhe/0/AC922_8335-GTG_OpenPowerReadme.v1.3.xhtml IBM POWER9 Systems Server Firmware]</ref>. | ||
=== POWER9 === | === POWER9 === | ||
| − | Hardware fixes are in place for [[POWER9]] Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above <ref name="hostboot-commit-fcf7d0e3" />. | + | Hardware fixes are also in place for [[POWER9]] Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above <ref name="hostboot-commit-fcf7d0e3">[https://git.raptorcs.com/git/talos-hostboot/commit/?id=fcf7d0e3f5fe8013b8f88a70a4f69cb5c0efc38b Hostboot commit message listing security changes for NDD2.2 / CDD1.1]</ref>. In conjunction with the above kernel patch, Meltdown is fully mitigated on the production POWER9 devices. |
== Official statement from Raptor Computing Systems regarding Talos™ II == | == Official statement from Raptor Computing Systems regarding Talos™ II == | ||
Revision as of 11:27, 24 February 2018
In January of 2018, news of three speculative execution vulnerabilities was made public. Information about these vulnerabilities had been disclosed in private to certain companies and projects in June of 2016.
| CVE | Group | Google Project Zero name[1] |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2017-5715 | Spectre | Variant 2: branch target injection |
| CVE-2017-5753 | Spectre | Variant 1: bounds check bypass |
| CVE-2017-5754 | Meltdown | Variant 3: rogue data cache load |
At this time we know that POWER9, POWER8, POWER8E, POWER7+, POWER6, and certain PowerPC architectures are affected by at least some of these vulnerabilities. [2][3][4][5]
Contents
CVE-2017-5715 (Spectre variant 2)
POWER9
Hardware fixes are in place for POWER9 Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above [6]. With these hardware changes, Spectre variant 2 is believed to be mitigated on the production POWER9 devices.
CVE-2017-5753 (Spectre variant 1)
POWER9
Hardware fixes are in place for POWER9 Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above [6]. With these hardware changes, cross-process attacks via Spectre variant 1 are believed to be fully mitigated on the production POWER9 devices.
CVE-2017-5754 (Meltdown)
Common Mitigations
POWER7, POWER8, and POWER9 are patched from CVE-2017-5754 by purging the L1 cache when context switching to a less privileged process, as the vulnerability on these architectures affects L1 but not L2 cache.[7] Firmware updates are also required to enable workarounds at the hardware level.[8] [9].
POWER9
Hardware fixes are also in place for POWER9 Nimbus DD2.2 / Cumulus DD1.1 and above [6]. In conjunction with the above kernel patch, Meltdown is fully mitigated on the production POWER9 devices.
Official statement from Raptor Computing Systems regarding Talos™ II
POWER9 will not ship with vulnerability to Meltdown or any loss in performance compared with the current prototype chips (DD2.1). Further, Spectre is fully mitigated with the exception of the same-process issue that is affecting the entire CPU industry. As far as we are aware there will be no further mitigation from any major CPU vendor now or in the future, as the remaining Spectre issue has been deemed an application level programming issue versus a CPU design issue. Patches for GCC to help fix the affected applications are already rolling out.
External Links
References
- ↑ Reading privileged memory with a side-channel. Project Zero blog
- ↑ IBM PSIRT Blog post, Potential Impact on Processors in the POWER family
- ↑ TenFourFox Development blog post, Actual field testing of Spectre on various Power Macs
- ↑ Raptor Engineering GNU Social notices about POWER8 and POWER9 vulnerability
- ↑ Red Hat security page for Kernel Side-Channel Attacks
- ↑ 6.0 6.1 6.2 Hostboot commit message listing security changes for NDD2.2 / CDD1.1
- ↑ Larabel, Michael. PowerPC Memory Protection Keys In For Linux 4.16, Power Has Meltdown Mitigation In 4.15. 2018-01-22
- ↑ IBM Power8 Systems Server Firmware
- ↑ IBM POWER9 Systems Server Firmware
